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Fichte had lectured on the vocation of the scholar—or more precisely, morality for scholars-- in
1794 at the beginning of his career in Jena; he returns to the theme on the occasion of his call to
a professorship in Erlangen in 1805 and subsequently publishes them under the title Über das
Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheingungen im Gebiete der Freiheit (1806). He warns in a
brusque preface that these lectures are published for the convenience of students who have not
had the chance to hear them, that they are not presented as literary works, and that he has
nothing to say to a reading public with whom he is increasingly disinclined to engage (GA I, 8:
59) 1. Schelling, nonetheless, seizes upon the published text as the breaking of a long, selfimposed silence on technical (wissenschaftlich) philosophy in a brief review that he uses as a
preface to a longer review of this work and the subsequently published Grundzüge des
gegenwärtigen Zeitalters and Die Anweisung zum seigen Lebens oder auch die Religionslehre.
Schelling’s essay, Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der
verbessertten Fichteschen Lehre: Eine Erläuterungschrlift der ersten (1806), extends the
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somewhat subdued presentation of his own identity- and nature-philosophies made in
Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1802) into aggressively polemical
territory. That both philosophers appeal to ‘Ideas’ or ‘the Idea of the Absolute’ to ground their
ideas of the unity of human knowledge and/or the unity of morality indicates the common
ground they shared from 1795 to the turn of the century. That Schelling speaks of the unity of
knowledge in the multi-disciplinary array of faculties in the university while Fichte speaks of the
morality of scholars in the context of the human enterprise (“to come to freedom with reason”)
indicates their fundamental difference in their approach to systematizing human cognition as
transcendental idealism. It would be difficult to reconstruct what the educated public made of all
these essays, since it lacked the Ur-text : the Fichte-Schelling Briefwechsel, especially the
exchanges of the years 1800-1802. Intimates such a G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich
Schleiermacher were able to figure out Schelling’s side of ‘the difference’. Fichte had not
chosen to publish the texts of the presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/02 or the three
Berlin lecture series of 1804, so Schelling’s invention of a silence on Fichte’s part about
absolute- or first-philosophy had a certain plausibility—while it enabled Schelling to extend the
public clarification of the views he advanced in the 1802 dialogue Bruno and the academic
studies lectures about the unity of knowledge, the reach of absolute or objective idealism, and the
methodology of the natural sciences. The core contentions of Fichte’s Wesen des Gelehrten
lectures and Schelling’s review of them are plain, nonetheless: Fichte’s claim that Schelling
prized a dead, mechanical nature over the life of spirit in his ‘idealism’ is met by Schelling’s
counter-claim that Fichte had ever and always opted for a narrow idealism of human subjectivity.
The presence of these clashing claims in the two sets of lectures on scholars, their calling, and
their habitat almost obscures a fundamental commonality: following upon Kant’s Streit der

2

Facultaten, each seeks to enshrine philosophy as the university’s fundamental discipline,
disputing the historical claims of sovereignty advanced by the professional or politically
supported domains of law, medicine and theology, and seeking to block the growing ascendancy
of historical and empirical-scientific disciplines.
For the sake of simplicity, this essay will pursue a chronological path through four main
items of discussion: (1) the difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophies as
reflected in the Correspondence of 1800-1802, (2) Schelling’s remarks on the unity of
knowledge and the difference between empirical science and Naturphilosophie in the academic
studies lectures, (3) Fichte’s remarks on first-philosophy, nature and morality in the Wesen des
Gelehrten lectures, especially the first two, (4) Schelling’s subsequent polemical response. The
overarching problematic is not whether human cognition is a system or can be rendered
systematic in a philosophical construction—there is substantial agreement on that issue, the one
which post-modern thought finds so problematic—but whether the freedom of the moral point of
view or the objectivity of nature indicated by established scientific domains will furnish the
paradigm for such a construction.
____________
[1] Much of the Correspondence in the early months of 1800 is essentially political, concerned
with plans to form a united front for the transcendental idealists and romantic writers living in
Jena or Berlin. When Fichte receives Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism after the
fall book-fair, he comments to its author that he is wrong to oppose consciousness and nature or
to provide separate constructions of them within that work. Both writers had spoken of real and
ideal activities and although they might contrast nature as real-ideal to consciousness itself as
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ideal-real, the two activities are united in the I. For transcendental philosophy, argues Fichte,
nature can only be something found—finished, perfect, and intelligible to be sure, but shaped not
according to its own laws but from the lawfulness borrowed from intelligence. Both nature and
consciousness can be philosophically constructed only because philosophy performs a subtle
abstraction—presumably from the I—and subsequently constructs transcendental or fictional
accounts both of nature and individual consciousness (HkA III, 2, 1: 276; PRFS 42). 2
Schelling cannot accept this account: nature is not just ‘found’ intelligence, but
intelligence that is productive and objective. While ordinary consciousness discovers intelligence
in nature after the fact as something objective or merely found, transcendental (constructive)
idealism finds it to be both productive and objective, a lesser derivative or potency of the
transparently active productivity of consciousness. He goes on to sketch two ways
transcendental idealism might receive systematic shape, each with the 1794/95 Grundlage des
gesamten Wissenschaftlehre as its foundation: (a) philosophy as such, with physics and ethics,
both in the broadest Greek sense, and both founded on the above-mentioned abstraction and
fictional construction of its concrete domains, or (b) a simpler parallel construction of nature and
consciousness, both mirroring an essentially active intelligence, but the later starting where the
former begins (HkA III, 2, 1: 279-281; PRFS 44-46). Neither option is attractive to Fichte, for
the former essentially concedes Kant’s charge that Wissenschaftslehre is mere logic, empty
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tautology, while the latter gestures to a domain of reality beyond the reach of activity or the I’s
self-positing.
Fichte drafts a reply that is slightly paranoid and significantly self-critical: the subjective
[or the domain of the individual I] is indeed a construct and it is imported into philosophy’s
object through an act of the imagination. For all that, the I cannot be explained by that [nature]
which it has itself explained or deduced. The real reason for Schelling’s apparent lapse into
realism and for the muddled Spinozism of the romantic writers is not that objectivity has not
received an adequate account in Wissenschaftslehre, but that the original check or limitation of
activity implicit in its triad of principles has been left unexplained. An account of the intelligible
world is missing, and absent that the check is mere factical, or indeed a surd. Hints in that
direction are contained in the third book of the Vocation of Man, but they are mere hints (HkA
III, 2, 1: 289-290; PRFS 48-49). Fichte’s actual reply is more anodyne: while the principles of
Schelling’s philosophy of nature do not follow from the published Wissenschaftslehre, an
extension of its principles that locates some basis for intelligibility in nature might be found in an
extension of its principles that seems to be demanded by the times. Such an extension would be
a ‘transcendental system of the intelligible world’; it would explain individual consciousness on
the basis of a reality or limitation found in a noumenal nature—and so get around Schelling’s
difficulty of wanting to explain a phenomenal nature by a phenomenal consciousness and vice
versa (HkA III, 2, 1: 287-288; PRFS 49). Fichte’s conciliatory gesture is not fruitful, for
Schelling takes the single word “extension” to imply that anything goes, and Fichte’s attempts to
produce an account of the intelligible world seem to compromise the Kantian distinction of the
transcendent and the transcendental. Indeed, the versions of Wissenschaftslehre penned in
1801/02, 1804, and the popular distillation of those works in the 1805 lectures on the scholar all
5

prominently feature a divided ontology, a first-philosophy or ontology offered on its own
merits—seemingly a transcendent metaphysics—and an appended phenomenology.
Fichte in fact offers a short version of this two-layer or two-world theory in a letter
penned in mid-summer 1801. It declares the philosophy must start from seeing, not from being,
if it is transcendental or a matter of Evidenz, as one of Euclid’s postulates would be in geometry.
It is not a matter of deploying a web of concepts, for concepts are placeholders or frozen
intuitions. A complete philosophy would have to explain absolute consciousness as in one sense
a sum of individual consciousnesses, or in another sense, as a ground for all individual
consciousnesses. So Fichte calls the absolute or God at once the ideal ground of the identity of
all consciousnesses and the real ground for their separation as individuals. While
Wissenschaftslehre can explain the universal form of I-hood and its relationship to absolute
consciousness (namely as the relation of the determinate to the determinable), its moves are
conceptual, while individual consciousness seems to be beyond description or
conceptualization—with both its self-presence (or seeing) and the limitation of its individuality
that it factically is forever escaping philosophical account. If, as Fichte says, “being is—a seeing
that is impenetrable to itself”, then this account embraces two impenetrables, that of God or the
Absolute and that of individual consciousness in its limitation to individuality. One can say
(metaphysically, after Leibniz) that Wissenschaftslehre presents the universal form of the spirit
world and that every individual is a particular point of view upon this system from its own point
of view, but the missing point of individuation is available only in and through life, not through
philosophy or genetic explanation (HkA III, 2, 1: 365-368; PRFS 56-58).
While much in the foregoing account is difficult or frankly unintelligible despite its
author’s use of arithmetic formulae and the analogy the geometer’s use of “self-evident”
6

postulates, it is clear that Fichte objected to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie because it began and
ended with being, not seeing, that the activity imported into its account of the levels of dynamic
process was imagined or fictive activity, and that life, if ever accessible to philosophy, was
forever beyond the reach of this objective and objectifying philosophy. Fichte eschews the
labels of subjectivity and objectivity that Schelling comes to prefer after 1801 not because they
tilt the game in Schelling’s favor, but because they have nothing to do with transcendental
philosophy as he understands it, which is the genesis of an immediate comprehension of I-hood
from the inside out, hence the necessary condition of experience. “No consciousness without
self-consciousness” is Fichte’s watchword. If a philosophy shifts the ground to what is
experienced, as happens in the objective or absolute idealism of Schelling and Hegel, the warrant
of the ‘transcendental’ pedigree is lost and philosophy increasingly becomes talk about
everything from no particular point of view.
_______
[2] Schelling uses the lectures on academic studies he delivered at Jena in the summer of 1802 to
explain and defend the ‘real-idealism’ of the 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy, to
defend his Naturphilosophie and to advance the claim that philosophy is the fundamental and
unifying discipline in the contemporary German university. While My System was written under
the constraints of a promise to not to go public on their disagreements and while the 1802
dialogue Bruno made moves both polemical and conciliatory in antique disguise, both the
exchange of letters between Fichte and Schelling and the underlying friendship they signified
ended early in 1802. Schelling was free to speak his mind, admittedly to a gathering of freshmen
assembled in the summer months.
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Schelling was in fact rather slow in seizing the ground of his new so-called identityphilosophy, since its initial presentations were heavily dependent upon historical models of
earlier systems, the Presentation upon a rather literal reading of the first two books of Spinoza’s
Ethics, the Bruno upon a Neoplatonically costumed Spinozism in which talk of ineffable
substance and its effable modes of mind and matter is replaced by more elegant and spiritual
sounding talk of eternal ideas seamlessly embracing both the infinite and the finite. The first
lecture of the academic studies series adopts this talk of ideas and the Idea of the Absolute, but it
is careful to express this idea in the context of the broader concept of knowledge as such: the
immediate identity of the ideal and the real. The geometer illustrates this general identity in the
clearest possible manner, directly utilizing insight into the axioms and postulates that integrate
the nature of points, line, figures and surfaces with three-dimensional space to organize the study
of empirical lines, figures and bodies (SW V, 215-216; US 9-10). 3 If knowledge is one, it must
be so because it exists as one idea in the Absolute, and because we as human knowers are
congruent with this single but all-embracing idea. Lacking a productive relation to this
archetypal unity, many of the neuter drones at work in the hive of learning produce but inorganic
excretions, by which Schelling means the mass of professional skills and empirical aptitudes
taught in the university which lack any orientation to the organic body of knowledge or the
ability to reproduce themselves therein (SW V, 216-217; US 10-11). But premature
professionalism is not the only impediment to the university’s realization of the totality of
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knowing; the call to action [-- heard everywhere in this revolutionary time, but especially in
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre--] is distorting and distracting. Knowing and acting are not hard and
fast opposites in the Absolute, nor empirical alternatives in life, for the Absolute exhibits a
double movement: to image its being in its form and resolve its form (or display) back into
essence; in just such a way cognition and action mirror and reinforce each other in life (SW V,
217-221; US 12-15). Schelling is clearly critical of the influence of Fichte’s moralism and
social activism in the university, but there is no hint of the gloves-off polemic and personal
attack that Fichte’s Wesen des Gelehrten will provoke in 1806.
The eleventh lecture on the natural sciences defends the idea and fruitfulness of
Naturphilosophie as a discipline that is at once above and alongside the disparate, particular
sciences such as physics or chemistry. Any complete account of cognition as such must start
with its function in the Absolute, whereby the productivity of God is manifested as particular
worlds or ‘ideas’, each of them organic and individual at the same time, all of them related
because they manifest the singular divine reality. Life, productivity and internal relatedness are
thus the characters of living cognition. Only because the law of the Absolute is to be selfcognizing or its own object are ideas produced that completely manifest the divine essence, and
only by resolving empirically disparate things into their idea does a genuine cognition arise (SW
V, 317; US 115). This process of manifestation of the universal in the particular and selfrecognition in the resolution of particulars back into the universal is further continued in the
mirror relationship that hold between ideas and empirical particulars. Ideas ensoul particulars
and govern them either by inorganic forces such as gravity or magnetism, or by internal selfregulation such as is seen in homeostatic systems or organisms, or by the self-cognizant selfregulation which manifests as reason in the intelligent being (SW V, 318; US 116). If cognition
9

is arrayed on a scale that runs from a knowing that makes the object extrinsic to the knower to a
cognition that is internal, focused on itself and holistic, two distinct approaches to the study of
nature open up: the empirical investigation of the particular which is the business of the
particular scientific disciplines in their separations from each other and the philosophical
approach which strives to reconfigure the particular in its origination from the ideas, and
ultimately from the single Idea of the Absolute. The spirit of modern physics is embodied in the
philosophical (or anti-philosophical) moves Descartes makes to separate mind and matter, and to
study the inorganic world apart from the organic, adopting the hypothesis of mechanism that
change or movement can only origination in a communication of energy from outside (SW V,
319-320; US 117-118). The final product of the dualism inherent in this approach is the image of
matter as intrinsically lacking life—just dead extended stuff: imponderable, weightless,
unlimited, the ideal subject in a kingdom of death.
Naturphilosophie offers a distinct approach to the study of nature. It is not opposed to
empiricism as theory is opposed to experiment, for theorizing or hypothesis-formation and the
testing of hypothesis by experiment are equally features of empiricism. Philosophy offers the
path of construction or construction in intellectual intuition; it represents the presence of the real
in the ideal, or of the particular in the idea. Particular forms replicate the universal movement of
the imaging of the universal in the particular in the Absolute and the converse resolution of
particulars back into the universal. Mind is reconciled to nature only when it can recognize itself
therein, or view nature as a living totality that is self-animated and self-produced. The dead
matter of modern physics is reconfigured as ideality or life itself in Naturphilosophie (SW V,
320-325; US 120-123). –Fichte’s criticisms are not on stage in this discussion, but the contrast
between a style of natural science that is grounded in the life of nature and not the dead stuff of
10

mechanistic materialism will be central to Schelling’s 1806 refutation of Fichte’s attack upon
Naturphilosophie in Wesen des Gelehrten.
___________
[3] In the first lecture of his 1805 series on academic life and conduct, Fichte begins his
discussion of morality for scholars by contrasting natural human existence in the sensible world
with a life oriented toward a higher, hidden ground—a ground of appearances, simply called the
divine idea. The scholar is defined by this idea—that is what makes him a scholar—and by
unreserved dedication to or love of the idea. Of course the distinction between natural existence
and its ideal ground is artificial; at any moment, the idea is mediated by the culture of the era, but
however much it is present or obscured by that culture, the scholar is defined by his unreserved
love for the idea (GA I, 8: 64-65). There is nothing technical nor philosophical in the locution:
göttliche Idee. It simply designates an intellectual as opposed to a sensible field for human
endeavor. But unlike other distinctions such as that of the learner as opposed to the
accomplished scholar, love of the idea designates both the Was and the Wie of the scholarly
calling.
The second lecture is devoted to a closer definition of this still obscure idea of a ground
of appearances. While Fichte excuses himself from the task of an exact or scientific derivation
of the Idea’s traits here, he claims that a ‘feel for the truth’ should be adequate to motivate the
acceptance of several propositions:
•

Being is simply and thoroughly characterized by life and activity; there is nothing dead,
inactive, or imperfect about it.
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•

The sole living item is the life of God or of the Absolute; it is alive in itself, through
itself, by itself.

•

The divine life is purely in itself, hidden away as it were, self-enclosed, without any
alteration or change.

•

But the divine idea manifests itself, appears, presents itself—its presentation or
concretion is the world. God presents godself as it can, while the divine idea remains pure
and self-enclosed.

•

As much as the divine idea is simple, unitary and self-enclosed, its presentation (the
entire life of humankind) is necessary an infinite unfolding or temporal process. When
the all-at-once of the idea is translated to the temporal order, life itself is to some extent
negated, limited, put within constraints, or mixed with what is dead and lifeless. Forced
within limits, life in time manifests as a striving to transcend limitation (GA I, 8: 71-72).

Fichte’s philosophical catechism is quite simple, unadorned by argument. Three contrasts
converge: appearance versus reality, life versus death, activity versus constraint or limitation.
Fichte proceeds to identify the constraints of the above discussion with the objective, material
world or nature. Though nature has its ground in the divine life, its function is to be nothing
other than a foil for the existence of another, ‘divine’ life in human endeavor. Nature’s destiny is
to be negated, to serve as means for human life. Fichte then turns to sermonizing:
Do not be blinded or misled by a philosophy that appropriates the name naturephilosophy and thinks that it has surpassed all previous philosophy by making nature
absolute and tries to divinize it. From time immemorial, all theoretical errors and all
practical corruptions of human ideals have been grounded in the tendency to steal the
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names being and existence and apply them to that which neither is nor exists, and which
sought life and the joy of life in that which intrinsically harbored death (ibid., 73-74).
Several positive notes remain that need to be voiced, and Fichte exhibits them with great
economy:
•

The human being can generally understand from the assumptions articulated above that
there is an origin of and a cause for the temporal flow in which she lives, but there is no
way to undo it or overleap all limitation, since reality and appearance, or the divine life
and its temporal presentation are forever two, not one.

•

If one could gather all the fragments and pieces of the temporal display of life and
reassemble them, one might understand how there can be reality and appearance, or how
the display in ever-lapsing time translates the divine being. But that is counter-intuitive:
the human knower and agent is itself part of time.

•

Recourse to experience is necessary to understand the current state of being, or where one
is. Consciousness is oriented toward experience, and experience is embedded in the flow
of time.

•

So thoroughly is the human being immersed in time and circumstances that have taken
shape in time that the only way the human has of orienting herself in life is through the
moral law. The transcendence of limits and the reacquisition, as it were, of the original
life is a moral, not a cognitive imperative. Educated reflection suffices to illuminate
only what must be done with our freedom of action (74-76).

The academy’s calling, then, is essentially moral; its leading disciplines, besides philosophy
which alone can provide some theoretical illumination of the general truths that can be
13

understood, will be jurisprudence and religion or natural hierarchy. When the arts and sciences
are added, with their capacities to deal with details as well as the whole, the fundamental
disciplines of the learned world will number five (79).
Other than to note how brief, intuitive, and unargued the above presentation is, we
postpone comment until we consider Schelling’s reaction. Most reviewers of the printed version
of the lectures considered this philosophical section of the lectures alone; Fichte’s
recommendations of qualities such as application, diligence, and integrity are the standard stuff
of academic virtue-ethics.
_______
[4] Schelling’s reception of Fichte’s lectures on the morality of scholars falls into two parts: a
brief review that appeared in the Jena Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung, and a longer, overtly
polemical review of all the popular works of 1806, including the Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen
Zeitalters and the Anweisung zum seligen Leben. Generally, Schelling takes the first two lectures
of the Wesen des Gelehrten as a clue to his discernment of the other works, finding their contents
to be clear, unambiguous—and self-contradictory.
The review takes the lectures to be Fichte’s “breaking of the multi-year silences he has
maintained on his philosophical views,” takes note of the scornful comment addressed to the
reading public in its preface, and wonders aloud why Fichte’s promised revisions of the
Wissenschaftslehre have never appeared (SW VII, 4-5). As far as his theoretical philosophy
goes, Schelling isolates three of Fichte’s assertions:
•

All being is living and self-active;

•

The Absolute or God is life itself;
14

•

The divine life is hidden in itself, self-enclosed and self-supporting. It is all being and no
other sort of being is outside it,

but wonders what this can mean, since being is usually taken to mean the opposite of activity, or
to entail the denial of possibility of activity (SW VII, 6). Then comes the question of how any
sort of particularized being can be added to the self-enclosed divine life: either, as Jacobi
paraphrased Spinoza, there can be no stepping-outside the Absolute or there will be some sort of
emanation of an inferior sort of being, as the Neoplatonists envisioned. Fichte seems to think
that it is self-evident or at least non-problematic that there is some sort of stepping-outside or
emanation, but Schelling doubts that Fichte was doing more than mouthing words at this point,
since on his own assumptions, a Heraustreten des Absoluten aus sich selbst is unthinkable. Is it
essential that God manifest godself externally, or not essential? If essential, then the Absolute is
conditioned, that is, subject to a law that it must produce this external display. The very idea that
besides an absolute and unconditioned God there is necessarily a conditioned external display
entails uncountable difficulties (ibid., 7). There are difficulties too in Fichte’s stipulation that the
Absolute’s Darstellung must take the form of a display that unfolds in endlessly lapsing time: is
not the heart of the phenomenology that transcendental idealism teaches the view that time is but
a subjective form of presentation, an ens imaginarium (ibid., 8)?
Schelling turns from Fichte’s account of what is to his account of what is not: nature.
Since humankind pertains not to nature, but to God in some undefined sense, a negative factor
must be introduced to account for it; this is the restriction or limitation that squeezes the fullness
of being, as it were, into an elongated or progressive form, time. Since Fichte lacks any idea of a
positive connection between being and becoming other than purposiveness and the moral
command, the negative idea of restriction (Hemmung) is made to do the work. But a negative
15

account can do no positive work: to say that there must be a restriction so that an endless
development can occur is like saying that worms lack eyes so that they can be blind (ibid., 9-10).
Fichte pronounces nature dead, ignoring the implication that if nature involves the limitation of
divine reality, it must have some element of reality to it. Nature means objective reality, but how
can a limitation, a subjective entity, produce something objective? Furthermore, if nature is
something dead and a product of a purely negative factor, how are Fichte’s initial assumptions
about God, life and reality anything other than transcendent pronouncements, not merely
assumptions made in the service of transcendental explanation? Whatever else it can or cannot
do, a philosophy that it supposed to explain the possibility of experience cannot start out by
denying the validity of experience (ibid., 13-15).
Schelling then turns to Fichte’s ethical ideas, starting with “Fichte’s atheistic view of
nature.” Since nature is but a restriction on human activity and an obstacle to the manifestation
of divine life, the best that can be done with it is to instrumentalize it—turn forests into stools
and other furniture, employ reason to transform nature’s flora and fauna into human
conveniences, and behave as if there is no meaning in green woods rustling in the wind other
than to serve as fuel to warm ‘rational’ beings (ibid., 18-19). The artificiality of this purely
economical view of nature is matched by the etiolated nature of the morality of duty that Fichte
advocates. What sort of people need to have a list of duties endlessly prescribed to it, especially
when no guidance is given about how to resolve apparent conflicts of duty? And what kind of
morality is produced by the dry prescriptive mode—anything more than the inept conformity to
‘rules of style’ that an author with nothing to say, or with no acquaintance with truth or beauty,
can produce? Why not trust, instead, the life of a people, their sentiments, their ways of life,
their common conscience (20)?
16

Schelling expands upon most of these criticism at length, oftentimes with intemperate
zeal, in the lengthy second part of his review of Fichte’s trilogy—an inverted Divine Comedy in
which the lectures on the present age lead the reader through hell, to the purgatory of the
scholarly life, and finally to the ersatz paradise of the ‘blessed life’ essay (SW VII, 87). We
must forego a lengthy treatment and merely state that most of the discussion is an elaboration, or
a polemical amplification, of points succinctly made in the ALZ review. Two items are new to
Schelling’s critique, however, and deserve some attention: a short list of Fichte’s errors that
Schelling uses to begin the longer discussion and Schelling’s own metaphysical reply to the
divided ontology of Fichte’s second Wesen des Gelehrten lecture.
First, the ‘syllabus of errors’, which we translate without comment:
Our present purpose requires only that we discuss . . . items that Herr Fichte has taught
and asserted:
•

a cognition of the in-itself or the Absolute is forever impossible for humans;

•

we can only know about our knowing [Wissen], must start from it and remain
within it;

•

nature is an empty objectivity, merely the sense-world;

•

it [nature] consists solely in the affections of our I, depends on incomprehensible
restrictions within which the I feels enclosed, and is essentially irrational, unholy,
and godless;

•

it is everywhere finite and completely dead;

•

the basis of all reality, of all cognition is the individual [persönliche] freedom of
the human being;
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•

the divine can only be believed, not cognized;

•

this belief is solely of the moral kind, and if it contains more than what follows
from the concept of morality, it is senseless superstition (SW VII: 21).

For the second item, Schelling challenges the most difficult idea of Fichte’s second lecture, the
contention that there is being or the divine idea or the divine life, but it is strictly in itself and
unto itself, for we in our knowing and acting pertain to a different order where God has
presented godself and become existence, external existence, the world—and where the divine
life manifests itself as consciousness constrained by the flow of ever-lapsing time (GA I, 8: 7172). Schelling’s challenge is not merely negative; for that it would suffice to note that Fichte has
cleverly hidden the chasm between being and phenomena or God’s Darstellung with his claim
that we can understand the Daϐ but not the Wie of the cleft (ibid., 74). Instead Schelling reaches
back to line of thought initiated in 1802 which conceives God or the Absolute as self-realizing,
the idea that is not just idea, but self-actualized idea. Schelling had changed his terminology
slightly in his 1804 lectures on the Entire System of Philosophy, and Nature-Philosophy in
Particular, where he views God as essentially self-affirmation, real or existent both as that which
affirms and that which is affirmed—and so real and realized both in nature and in human reason
(SW VI: 151-155). Refining that view, Schelling now says that the divine reality is not only
expressive or self-affirming, it is a band or bond [Band] between affirming and affirmed.
If in general what is is self-expressive and so self-knowing, as it is in the highest case or
God, there can be no divide between being [Wesen] and expression [Form], or affirmation and
affirmed. Similarly there can be no divide between the one and the many, or between being and
knowing, or between philosophy that comprehends being and nature-philosophy—for the one is
replicated in the many, being is mirrored in knowing, and God is mirrored in and to that extent
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present in nature (SW VII: 54-56). One who finds nature but an aggregate of lifeless items fails
to see the one in the many, or the living unity of the many in the one item viewed-- one who, for
instance, views bodies as inert masses pushed by incomprehensible external forces, not as a
living field (gravity) where singular items (bodies) are relatively and temporarily distinguished
(ibid., 57).
Ultimately there can be but two types of metaphysical theories—those that connect and
those that divide. Those that would view nature as a contingent collection of multiple items
operate with relative concepts and are unable to transcend the fixed view that one and many are
simply different, or that the infinite (God) and the finite (nature) somehow exist outside each
other. It is reflection, not reason, that approaches the primal unity of all and thinks it must solve
an imagined problem of a cleft or chasm [Spaltung] between orders of things it does not know
how to comprehend (ibid., 58). Reason sees things in connected fashion, so it conceives of
nature an eternal mirroring of the divine being and form in one another, the eternal birth of things
in God and the resolution of all things back into God. Nature is not the absence of God or the
opposite of the divine life and to view it as such is to cast it into the abyss of incomprehensibility
(ibid., 59).
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